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By Blake Burgess
It is important for me, as a popular artist, to make clear to the governments of 
the United States and Mexico that despite the strategy of fear and intimidation 
to foreigners, despite their weapons, despite their immigration laws and military 
reserves, they will never be able to isolate the Zapatista communities from the 
people in the United States.1
-Zack de la Rocha, vocalist of the American rap metal band Rage Against the Machine
In an age where the transmission of ideas is instantaneous and widespread, 
political and ideological movements can gain momentum rapidly and receive 
support from a global community. The Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Na-
cional (EZLN) have utilized the internet and media as a tool to build sup-
port for their movement. With a somewhat mythical spokesperson, Subco-
mandante Marcos—who has used other noms de guerre—the EZLN have 
retained control over Chiapas, Mexico with little bloodshed or violence. In 
this paper I will provide an overview of the EZLN and its goals from its rise 
in 1994 to the present, examine the enigmatic Subcomandante Marcos and 
his role in the movement, the group’s use of the internet and media as a polit-
ical tool, and some perceptions on the EZLN’s successes and shortcomings. 
The EZLN’s use of the Internet and popular media, the role of Subcoman-
dante Marcos, and establishment of autonomous communities were key to 
their subversion of the Mexican government and their ability to maintain a 
presence. While the EZLN may have not succeeded in their lofty goals of 
spreading their brand of autonomy and resistance to the rest of Mexico, they 
succeeded in their goals of local autonomy.
1 “Interview with Zach, from Chiapas, Mexico,” Music Fan Clubs, July 7, 1998, accessed April 18, 2015, 
http://www.musicfanclubs.org/rage/articles/chiapas.htm
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Origins and Evolution
On New Year’s Eve, 1993 EZLN troops made their way to San Cristobal 
de las Casas and Ocosingo, thus starting what Ana Carrigan calls the “first 
post-modern revolution;”2 on January 1, 1994, the EZLN engaged the Mex-
ican government in the Chiapas region.3 These rebels were primarily indige-
nous Maya people and the uprising coincided with the adoption of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).4 NAFTA removed trade barriers 
between Canada, the US, and Mexico. This led to impoverished rural farmers 
in Mexico facing competition from US farmers, which were able to more ef-
ficiently raise crops such as corn.5 The initial fighting between the EZLN and 
Mexican National Army only lasted twelve days and the spokesman for the 
EZLN, Subcomandante Marcos, used the national press to create a “dialogue 
with the Mexican people.”6
In an interview, Marcos explained in the mid-1980s a small group went to 
the jungles of Chiapas with ideological roots in political-military guerrilla 
organizations that were present in 1960s and 1970s Latin America. The group 
struggled to adapt to the guerrilla lifestyle, but held out with the hopes of 
eventually having some sort of result. He explained that the group not only 
taught the indigenous people the basics found in mestizo culture (Mexican 
history, reading, writing, mathematics, biology, etc.), but that the group also 
learned from the indigenous. The EZLN began to understand the indige-
nous worldview and learned to survive as the indigenous had. He noted many 
struggles—those of peasants, workers, and students—all inevitably clash with 
power, be it the State or a dominant class. And to bring about change, armed 
struggle seemed to be the necessary route. Marcos mentioned the EZLN 
broke with the Left by proposing armed revolution at the time, but it was 
2 Ana Carrigan, “Chiapas: The First Post-Modern Revolution,” The Fletcher Forum 19, no. 1 (1995): 71.
3 Michael Radu, “Mexico: Slouching Toward Normality,” The Washington Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 47.
4 Oliver Froehling, “The Cyberspace ‘War of Ink and Internet’ in Chiapas, Mexico,” Geographical Review 87, 
no. 2 (April 1997): 291.
5 Courtney Jung, “The Politics of Indigenous Identity: Neoliberalism, Cultural Rights, and the Mexican 
Zapatistas,” Social Research 70, no. 2 (2003): 439-40.
6 Ana Carrigan, “Chiapas,” 71.
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necessary for the indigenous peoples as a defense against the ranchers who 
were encroaching on the indigenous communities. The dense jungle allowed 
for the EZLN to grow and to develop a relationship with the local people. 
Ultimately, Marcos explained, the line between “combatant force and civilian 
force” disappeared and whole communities were under the Zapatista banner.7
Over the years, the EZLN have released numerous communiqués, with the 
“First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle” released simultaneously with their 
January 1 assault. In this the EZLN addressed the people—and the govern-
ment—of Mexico, citing 500 years of struggle against foreign powers and do-
mestic dictators (such as Porfirio Diaz) neglecting to take care of the people. 
According to the EZLN, it was time to modify the government, per Article 
39 of Mexico’s Constitution which states that national sovereignty resides in 
the people and that the people “have the inalienable right to alter or modify 
their form of government.”8 The EZLN declared war against Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari’s regime, which maintained a political monopoly in Mexico due to 
the one-party system in place. The Zapatistas also set standards for themselves 
and requested the Red Cross to “watch over and regulate…battles” in order to 
legitimize their cause.9 Furthermore, the EZLN also declared that they would 
follow the Geneva Accords.10 By proclaiming constitutional legitimacy and 
claiming to have the Mexican people on their side, and abiding by interna-
tional standards and calling for international oversight, the EZLN was setting 
itself up as a force to be reckoned with.
The EZLN called for better “work, land, housing, education,…, democracy, 
justice, and peace.”11 Chiapas stands in stark contrast with much of Mexico 
as a whole. Sixty percent of the population in Chiapas lives in rural areas; in 
7 “Early and Extensive Interview with Subcomandante Marcos,” Schools for Chiapas, May 1994, accessed 
May 17, 2015, 
http://schoolsforchiapas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Interview-with-Subcomandante-Marcos.pdf.
8 General Command of the EZLN, “First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle: EZLN's Declaration of 
War,” The Struggle Site, June 1993, accessed April 20, 2015, http://struggle.ws/mexico/ezln/ezlnwa.html.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 General Command
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comparison, only about half of that number inhabits rural areas in Mexico. 
Nearly thirty-one percent of Chiapas was illiterate, whereas only thirteen per-
cent of Mexico as a whole was illiterate. Access to water, electricity, and other 
valuable resources was more limited in Chiapas (especially in some specific 
cities that the EZLN had taken control of ) than in the rest of Mexico; howev-
er, Chiapas was a relatively resource-rich area with fertile land and petroleum, 
producing a large amount of Mexico’s coffee and electricity. The wealth gener-
ated in Chiapas did not reach the indigenous people there.12 
Over the eleven years following the first declaration, five more declarations 
were issued. The Second Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, released just a 
few months after the first, reestablished the reasons for the group’s purpose 
and to assert its success in maintaining “international conventions of war.” 
Calling for government changes and for the people of Mexico to stand with 
the EZLN against the “bad government” and for democracy, the EZLN con-
tinued to show its determination in the face of strong military and political 
opposition.13 Subsequent declarations continued to call for, and expand upon, 
the demands set forth prior while decrying the Mexican government’s failure 
to follow through with its promises.
In February, 1996 the EZLN and the Mexican government gathered, with 
indigenous peoples, in order to reach an understanding. The San Andrés Ac-
cords were meant to form a “new relationship between indigenous peoples and 
the State.” The Accords called for new policies to allow for greater indigenous 
participation in decision-making and the raising of standards of living for the 
indigenous peoples of Mexico.14 Unfortunately, however, the process of get-
ting the Accords put into effect legally was slow and fraught with problems. 
For example, President Ernesto Zedillo refused to accept the proposal as it 
12 Edward J. Williams and Donald E. Schulz, eds., Mexico Faces the 21st Century (Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 1995), 166.
13 CCRI-CG, “Second Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle,” Wikisource, June 1994, accessed May 13, 
2015, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Second_Declaration_of_the_Lacandon_Jungle.
14 “Joint Declaration that the Federal Government and the EZLN shall submit to National Debating and 
Decision-Making Bodies,” 16 February 1996, accessed May 16, 2015, United Nations, 
http://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?field_pacountry_tid=mexico
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was; he wanted to make “minor” adjustments prior to approval. Any adjust-
ments, however, would void the meaning of the proposal in the eyes of the 
EZLN and they withdrew from further talks in January of 1997.15
“The War of Ink and Internet:” Subversion Through the Media
The emergence of the Internet in the early 1990s coincided perfectly with 
the rise of the EZLN. The Zapatistas utilized the fledgling technology to 
take their local news to the international stage and their survival was more 
than likely tied to this ability to communicate with a global audience.16 When 
combined with the “heavy-handed response” of the Mexican government, the 
EZLN’s successful use of the media and Internet allowed for various groups 
from around the world to rally around the movement.17 Beyond using the net 
and media attention to subvert the government, the EZLN has been influen-
tial in subverting the means of traditional guerrilla warfare. As Graham Fuller 
and his coauthors explain, the Zapatistas have demonstrated that the “old 
models of struggle,” of violently upending governments, is not necessarily the 
best way to create change in the “information age.”18 
The EZLN’s use of the Internet and other media outlets has earned the con-
flict the title of “la guerra de tinta e Internet [the war of ink and internet],” as 
José Ángel Gurría described it in 1995.19 The Mexican government had tried 
to isolate the EZLN and limit their coverage, but through the Internet and 
independent journalists the group has been successful in maintaining their 
“political connections” abroad.20 Their “war of words, images, imagination and 
15 Gemma van der Haar, “The Zapatista Uprising and the Struggle for Indigenous Autonomy,” European 
Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, no. 76 (April 2004): 101.
16 Jose Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History (Pitts-
burg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2010), 39.
17 Graham Fuller, David Ronfeldt, and John Arquilla, The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 1999), 3.
18 Graham Fuller, David Ronfeldt, and John Arquilla, The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 1999), 5.
19 Luis Hernández Navarro, “Chiapas: La Otra Guerra de Tinta e Internet,” La Jornada, December 1, 2009, 
accessed June 1, 2015 http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2009/12/01/opinion/017a2pol.
20 Harry Cleaver, “The Zapatistas and the Electronic Fabric of Struggle,” University of Texas at Austin, 
http://la.utexas.edu/users/hcleaver/zaps.html (accessed May 31, 2015)
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organization” was integral to that success.21 Outsiders posting and reposting 
every bit of available information have been helpful too. Everything from 
EZLN communiqués to official government reports to mainstream news ar-
ticles are disseminated across the net, thus subverting official channels and 
biases. The use of the Internet has allowed for a more informed and capable 
audience in assessing the situation in Chiapas.22 The ELZN’s use of eloquent 
rhetoric and the Web provides a useful tool for other revolutionary groups. 
As Kathleen Bruhn asserts, other organizations better versed in “military ma-
neuvers than in writing may feel compelled to imitate the communications 
strategy of the EZLN.” 23
While the Internet has been key for the EZLN, it should be noted that Chi-
apas is an impoverished region with virtually no internet access. The com-
muniqués were generally written by hand and then passed on to someone 
with access to the Internet.24 However, this does not diminish the impact 
that the Internet has had on the movement in regards to spreading the word 
and providing outside support, which were vital to the movement’s survival. 
Tim Golden, writer for the New York Times, asserts that “were it not for the 
Zapatistas' vocal partisans in the developed world that Mexico's leaders are so 
determined to join, the authorities might have crushed them long ago.”25 Due 
to the EZLN’s ability to gain some popular support, particularly from abroad, 
the Mexican government would have faced a public relations nightmare had 
they crushed the group.
As previously mentioned, outside support has been crucial to the movement 
as well. Innumerable scholars, journalists, and even celebrities have been fasci-
nated (and even endorsed) the EZLN, especially in the early years. For exam-
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Kathleen Bruhn, “Antonio Gramsci and the Palabra Verdadera: The Political Discourse of Mexico's 
Guerrilla Forces,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 51.
24 Juana Ponce de León, “Editor’s Note: Traveling Back for Tomorrow,” in Our Word is Our Weapon: Selected 
Writings, ed. Juana Ponce de León (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002), xxiii.
25 Tim Golden, “Revolution Rocks: Thoughts of Mexico’s First Postmodern Guerilla Commander,” New 
York Times, April 8, 2001, (accessed May 16, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/books/01/04/08/reviews/010408.08goldent.html.
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ple, Zack de la Rocha, vocalist of the popular American rap-metal band Rage 
Against the Machine, was an avid supporter of the Zapatistas, journeying to 
Chiapas in demonstrations of solidarity. He explained that in his numerous 
trips to the region, he has witnessed the isolation forced upon Chiapas as well 
as the government’s failure to act accordingly, opting instead to send in troops. 
The musician recalled that when he organized a group of students, artists, and 
activists to go to Chiapas prior to the San Andrés Accords and there they saw 
the military buildup and intimidation of community members by government 
forces. Many of the band’s songs reflect the Zapatista struggle and de la Ro-
cha’s experiences with the group.26 Essential to the group’s online presence and 
Internet appeal was Subcomandante Marcos.
A Face for the Faceless: Subversion and the Subcomandante
Subcomandante Marcos was a key figure in some of the relative success the 
EZLN had in gathering support against the government. Edward Williams 
and Donald Schulz explain that the “charismatic ski-masked commando” be-
came the EZLN’s spokesman, and a folk hero.27 Marcos’ “skillfully deployed 
combination of self-effacing subordination to the community he serves and 
individual charisma” was the source of intrigue and admiration that surrounds 
him.28 Marcos was a major component of the EZLN’s propaganda machine 
and was responsible for many of the group’s communiqués.29
On February 9, 1995, the Mexican government revealed “Marcos’” identity. 
In order to discredit the rebel’s “mythic hero” status and subvert the EZLN’s 
efforts, the government identified him as Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente, a 
former middle-class university professor from Mexico City—this was rather 
unsuccessful, however. Marcos was able to win back sympathy by “portraying 
himself as a victim” of the oppressive governmental forces.30 In her examina-
26 “Interview with Zach, from Chiapas, Mexico.”
27 Williams and Schulz, Mexico Faces the 21st Century, 12-3.
28 Beth Ellen Jorgensen, “Making History: Subcomandante Marcos in the Mexican Chronicle,” South 
Central Review 21, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 85.
29 Golden, “Revolution Rocks.”
30 Jorgensen, “Making History,” 98-9.
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tion of Juan Villoro’s work, Beth Jorgensen noted that masks and legends are 
a crucial part of Mexican history, and often endure longer than the “realities 
that inspired them.”31 The man had been overshadowed by his mask.
“Marcos,” however, was not the only nom de guerre utilized by the charismatic 
commando. With the launching of the Other Campaign in 2006, Marcos 
took on the role of Delegate Zero and toured Mexico.32 John Ross described 
the campaign as an “anti-electoral crusade designed to weld the underclass 
struggle groups into a new left alliance,” with Zero propelling himself into the 
spotlight once again during the electoral process; however, Ross argued that, 
due to the attention Zero had garnered, he was propelled into “the very class 
that the Other Campaign detests.”33 
Another nom de guerre was the result of a paramilitary assault on the auton-
omous community La Realidad on May 2, 2014—where a school and clinic 
were attacked—that left fifteen Zapatistas injured and one killed. The one 
killed was Jose Luis Solis Lopez, whose pseudonym was Galeano.34 Subco-
mandante Marcos, and the EZLN leadership, concluded that the attack was 
premeditated and “cultivated from above,” implicating the National Action 
Party (PAN), the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI), the Green Eco-
logical Party (PRI branch that operated in Chiapas), and the paramilitary 
group CIOAC-Historica.35 The paramilitary group ambushed the victims 
and brutally murdered Lopez.36 On May 25, 2014 at approximately 2:00 am, 
Subcomandante Marcos “ceased to exist” so that Galeano may live on.37 Mar-
cos wrote, “to satisfy the impertinence that is death, in place of Galeano we 
31 Ibid.
32 Ramor Ryan, “Zapatistas Launch ‘Other’ Campaign,” The Independent, January 12, 2006, accessed May 
20, 2015, https://indypendent.org/2006/01/12/zapatistas-launch-other-campaign.
33 John Ross, “The Delegate Zero Factor,” The San Francisco Bay Guardian, May 17, 2006, accessed May 
20, 2015, http://www.sfbg.com/2006/05/17/delegate-zero-factor.
34 Leonidas Oikonomakis, “Farewell Marcos, Long Live Subcomandante Galeano,” Roarmag, May 26, 
2014, accessed May 20, 2015, http://roarmag.org/2014/05/subcomandante-marcos-steps-down-galeano/.
35 Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, “Pain and Rage,” Enlace Zapatista, May 8, 2014, accessed May 20, 
2015, http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/2014/05/10/pain-and-rage/.
36 Ibid.
37 Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, “Between Light and Shadow,” Enlace Zapatista, May 24, 2014, 
accessed May 20, 2015, http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/2014/05/27/between-light-and-shadow/.
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put another name, so that Galeano lives and death takes not a life but just 
a name—a few letters empty of any meaning, without their own history or 
life.”38 
Marcos and the EZLN command asserted the expendability of the persona of 
Marcos. By this point in time, another subcomandante had filled Marcos’ role 
as spokesman for the group. Subcomandante Insurgente Moisés, like Marcos, 
joined the EZLN in the mid-1980s and had a prominent role. Unlike Marcos, 
however, Moisés was an indigenous Tzetal; Marcos was a mestizo.39 Initially, 
Marcos was never meant to be a spokesperson; the EZLN did not intend to 
have a mestizo as their “face,” instead they had slated an indigenous Zapatista 
for the role, but he was killed. . Marcos then stepped up and took advantage of 
his “allure” to catapult the group into the spotlight, which did have its benefits; 
however, this also had the negative impact of intertwining Marcos and the 
movement to the point of them being inseparable.40 
Marcos had served his purpose of drawing attention to the plight of the indig-
enous by being a faceless entity in which anyone could project themselves in 
order to sympathize with the movement. “One day Marcos’ eyes were blue, … 
green, … or black—all depending on who did the interview…”41 Marcos could 
represent everybody and nobody at once, and that was his power; however, 
Marcos, as he explained, became a distraction, and that was one reason why 
that persona was eliminated and that of Galeano was taken in its place. While 
Marcos was a key in the EZLN’s subversion of the Mexican government, his 
prominent role and inadvertent fame partially subverted the group’s goals.
Twenty Years On: Success or Failure?
The Zapatistas have made little progress outside of Chiapas in the last twen-
ty-one years and various scholars and media outlets have pointed out the 
38 Ibid.
39 Gloria Muñoz Ramirez, “EZLN Introduces New Subcomandante,” Upside Down World, February 16, 
2013, accessed May 20, 2015, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/mexico-archives-79/4132-ezln-introduc-
es-new-subcomandante-.
40 Oikonomakis, “Farewell Marcos, Long Live Subcomandante Galeano.”
41 Marcos, “Between Light and Shadow.”
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increasing irreverence of Marcos and the EZLN; however, does that mean 
that the group has failed in its lofty goals? Bethaney Turner argued that the 
international support generated through the Internet does not guarantee sig-
nificant changes in society, and the first decade of the EZLN’s efforts had not 
“precipitated the radical reconstruction of the Mexican political system that 
they had hoped for.”42 Turner perceived the movement as having deflated over 
time, and was not alone in that assessment. Turner perceived the movement 
as having deflated over time, and was not alone in that assessment. Mihalis 
Mentinis argued that even though the EZLN have attracted a large amount 
of attention, there was little consensus on their efficacy. 
Furthermore, according to Mentinis, the Zapatistas “have failed to bring 
about radical change, and have m43ade little progress on their broader political 
agenda.” Even in the first few years of the Zapatista movement, some have 
argued that the EZLN’s “capacity for insurgency” and its “social netwar” were 
“past its peak.”44 Not everybody was content with this analysis. As Immanuel 
Wallerstein explained, it was much like the answer that Zhou Englai was 
rumored to have provided as a response to the French Revolution: “It is too 
early to tell.”45 
Whether or not greater successes throughout Mexico will arise as a direct 
result of the Zapatistas is unknown, but the movement has been successful 
on a local level. As Marcos explained, “[t]he mere indisputable fact that the 
EZLN had not only not been weakened, much less disappeared, but rather 
had grown quantitatively and qualitatively would have been enough for any 
moderately intelligent mind to understand that, in these 20 years, something 
had changed within the EZLN and the communities.”46 The EZLN is still 
42 Bethaney Turner, “Information-Age Guerrillas: The Communication Strategies of the Zapatistas,” M/C 
Journal 8, no. 2 ( June 2005), accessed June 7, 2015, 
http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0506/01-turner.php.
43 Mihalis Mentinis, Zapatistas: The Chiapas Revolt and What It Means for Radical Politics (London: Pluto 
Press, 2006), xii.
44 Fuller, Ronfeldt, and Arquilla, The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico, 4.
45 Immanuel Wallerstein, “What Have the Zapatistas Accomplished?” Immanuel Wallerstein, January 1, 
2008, accessed June 7, 2015, http://iwallerstein.com/what-have-the-zapatistas-accomplished/.
46 Marcos, “Between Light and Shadow.”
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going twenty years later, which demonstrates some level of success. One of the 
greatest successes of the Zapatistas has come in the form of local, self-govern-
ing communities in Chiapas.
Bypassing the Government: Autonomous Communities
After withdrawing from negotiations with the government in 2007 and with 
legal avenues effectively at an impasse, the EZLN moved forward with the 
creation of a system of self-governance, forming autonomous municipalities, 
regardless of Federal approval, thus subverting governmental dominion over 
the region. Gemma van der Haar explained that these autonomous munici-
palities serve not only as a form of more legitimized resistance, but as gov-
ernmental structures to provide a system of justice, education, health care, 
economic development, and more in a flexible manner based on local condi-
tions. These autonomous communities are made up of locally elected councils 
and each of the systems (e.g. education, healthcare) are managed by commis-
sions made up of local peoples.47 The EZLN helped establish autonomous 
indigenous communities when the government failed to follow through with 
promises it made.
These autonomous communities were able to form with some outside help. 
In a brief history of these autonomous zones, Subcomandante Marcos not-
ed repeatedly that it was with the support of national and international civil 
societies that these communities could form. Marcos also explained, however, 
that the arrangement was not perfect and has its ups and downs; its own 
contradictions. Despite the problems, the autonomous communities—and the 
support of civil societies—helped improve the conditions, even if only a little, 
of normally excluded peoples (e.g. the indigenous, young persons, women, 
and a whole host of “others”).48 Where the government failed in creating a 
better situation for the indigenous people, the EZLN helped form autono-
47 van der Haar, 102-3.
48 Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, “Chiapas: La Treceava Estela, Quinta Parte: Una Historia,” Enlace 
Zapatista, July 2003, accessed May 16, 2015, 
http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/2003/07/21/chiapas-la-treceava-estela-quinta-parte-una-historia/.
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mous communities. This not only garnered some support of the local peoples 
in Chiapas, but also more support nationally and internationally.
Conclusion
The Zapatista Army of National Liberation’s prolific use of the Internet and 
media as well as the allure of the enigmatic Subcomandante Marcos were 
key to their longevity and subversion. The establishment of autonomous com-
munities were also immensely important and were arguably their greatest 
achievement. Internet usage and appeal had earned the early rebellion the 
title “The War of Ink and Internet,” while many have claimed Marcos and the 
EZLN to represent the first “post-modern revolution.” Despite not having 
accomplished a nation-wide revolution in Mexico, the Zapatistas have had 
some success at the local level for the indigenous people in Chiapas, which 
was a key motivation for the movement.
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